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Abstract: Despite the Corona crisis, London is pushing ahead with the implementation 
of Brexit. This will have a profound impact not only on the EU but also on Africa. The 
British government’s vision of a reinvigorated ‘Global Britain’ relies heavily on a 
reinforced co-operation with Commonwealth Sub-Saharan Africa. Already the 
temporary closure of manufacturing supply chains between China and the rest of the 
world because of the pandemic seriously affected economic activity in GB and the EU. 
However, African commodity exporters such as Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya will 
likely bear the brunt of both the direct and indirect effects of this weaker demand. This 
will add up to the economic effects of the spread of Corona in Africa. Most likely the 
vulnerable and the poor in Africa’s informal sector will have to suffer the most by both 
health hazards and the economic decline. 
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Introduction 
 
Although a second Corona-wave looms over the United Kingdom which threatens to 
aggravate the economic impact of the pandemic on the island even more, the British prime 
minister Boris Johnson persists to leave the EU at the end of 2020, whatever the cost.  
 
According to the latest forecast of the Office for National Statistics (ONS, London), the 
monthly gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 20.4% in April 2020, the biggest fall the UK 
had ever seen, more than three times larger than in March and almost ten times larger than the 
steepest pre-COVID-19 fall. Virtually all areas of the economy were hit, with pubs, education, 
health and car sales giving the biggest contributions to this historic fall. Moreover, Britain’s 
trade with the rest of the world was also badly affected by the pandemic, with large falls in 
both the import and export of cars, fuels, works of art and clothing (ONS, 2020). The 
(potential) negative economic effects of the Brexit on the UK (Brown et al, 2019; Kohnert, 
2018) would further aggravate the looming economic recession. According to Andy Haldane, 
the chief economist of the Bank of England, mass under- and unemployment is the result. 
More than 8 million self-employed and other people put on leave were concerned, i.e. almost 
a third of all gainfully employed people in the private sector, a level never to be seen on the 
labour market before. More than 1.5 million more may potentially have lost their jobs, 
judging by new universal credit claims. About 20% of households are afraid to face 
significant financial difficulties as a result of the pandemic. And it is almost certain that the 
hardest-hit will be the poor, the lower-paid, including young people and women (Haldane, 
2020). Accordingly, 68% of British adults were worried about the effect of the coronavirus 
(COVID-19) on their life in early June (ONS, 2020). This the more so because the 
Government's handling of the pandemic had resulted in the meantime in the highest Covid-19 
death toll in Europe (Campbell et al, 2020).  
 
Under these conditions, one would expect that London would be keen more than ever to profit 
from a potential common EU bailout for the years to come, both for the economic and the 
health concerned aftermath of the pandemic. This the more so, because of additional negative 
employment effects of Brexit. However, Johnson does not seem to care. And it is open to 
question whether those who voted the Prime Minister in power would act now otherwise. In 
fact, some politicians ventured already the guess, the British government may provoke a 
chaotic no-deal exit from the EU to distract from its failure in the COVID 19 crisis (Mason, 
2020).  
 
Anyway, apparently, there is a connection concerning the background-argument of both the 
Brexit and the handling of the corona-crisis. Brexiteer arguments as well as corona-ideologists 
reasoning centred on fantasies about British supremacy in matters of international trade 
(Brexit) and its scientific and inventive genius to cope with the pandemic. Both with lots of 
allusions to the Second World War. However, the wartime analogy is deeply misleading 
because Brexit involves the breaking up of the regulatory and customs market and would 
open the British market not only to European producers but to those from all over the world. 
The mythical picture of British innovation applies also to the Brexiteer arguments that hinge 
on the UK’s supposed leadership in creativity and innovation (Edgerton, 2020) and the notion 
that the British had no need of Europeans, or that at least “they need us more than we need 
them” (English, 2020). On the contrary, a no-deal Brexit could wreck the UK's chance of 
leading Covid-19 global research. Nobel scientists, like Sir Andre Geim at Manchester 
University, warned that Britain will lose ‘superpower’ status if access barred to the EU’s 
€100bn (£85bn) research funding scheme, Horizon Europe, which will run from 2021 to 
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2027. Since the start of the current EU scheme, Horizon 2020 (which will be succeeded by 
Horizon Europe), the UK has received more than £1.5bn in ERC income and £776m in 
MSCA (Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions) grants – more than any other EU country, and a 
fifth of the total (Helm & McKie, 2020).  
 
UK companies on the other hand apparently had a more realistic view and seemed to have 
been well aware of the looming risk. They voted already before the Corona-crisis with their 
money, sharp tongues would maintain, like rats deserting a sinking ship. However that may 
be, the Leave vote had led British firms already by March 2019 to increase the number of UK 
outward investment transactions in the remaining EU27 by 17%, whereas transactions in non-
EU OECD countries remained unaffected. On the other hand, the number of EU27 investment 
projects in the UK declined only by around 9%, which suggests that the UK would be more 
exposed to the costs of economic disintegration than the remaining EU member states 
(Breinlich et al 2020). By the way, no trade unions dared to equal this behaviour as 
'unpatriotic'. Apparently, international mobility of capital is always welcomed as a sign of 
innovative adaptation in difficult times. Whereas mobility of labour is often equalled to unfair 
competition, as in the case of East-European labourers who tried their luck in the UK, which 
after all triggered the Brexit vote. 
 
To return to the Brexit question, it is still open to question whether Britain’s pious wishes 
concerning the replacement of the EU internal market by extended links to its former 
Commonwealth markets, first and foremost to the US-market, will realise. London itself was 
rather cautious. It estimated in early March that enhanced bilateral trade with the US could 
result in rather modest prosperity, by its own gross domestic product increasing between 
0.07% and 0.16%, but only after around 15 years. But still, the United States is only the 
second-largest British trading partner after the EU. Moreover, the British government had 
been up to date opposed to American wishes, like a complete opening of agriculture for 
American investors and access to the National Health Service NHS for US pharmaceutical 
manufacturers (Triebe, 2020). Whether London's ambitions concerning the opening-up of 
African markets will be more promising is even more doubtful because the remaining EU-27 
does not lie low.  
 
As for the EU, the European Commission and European External Action Service presented in 
early March a draft comprehensive cooperation strategy with Africa in preparation of the sixth 
EU-AU summit in October. But the Corona-crisis and its effects, not only on the EU and 
Africa but on the whole world, reduced these high-flying plans to shambles.  
 
Although Europe will be severely hit by the pandemic, Africa is likely to suffer even more. 
According to the World Bank, the pandemic will cost the region between US $ 37 billion and 
$79 billion. The largest economies in the region, among them the heavy-weights of the 
African Commonwealth, South Africa and Nigeria, are expected to be hit the hardest by these 
economic effects. The collapse of oil and commodity prices, for example, will have a 
devastating impact on several African economies that depend on these for more than half of 
their exports (Laporte, 2020). To emasculate the threatening economic recession, African 
finance ministers called for an economic stimulus of at least US $ 100 billion to curb the 
impacts of coronavirus. But this will be only a drop in the bucket. Scholarly analysis showed 
that the average stimulus in Europe so far is 15 times higher than in poorer African countries 
(Laporte, 2020).  
 
There's also rising concern about possible disruption to food supply chains because of the 
virus' impact on farms and food imports. Particularly concerned are those in informal jobs 
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living hand-to-mouth. According to estimates of the African Union, nearly 20 million jobs are 
threatened across the entire continent. Many would rather prefer to die from Corona than from 
hunger (Kennedy, 2020; Bavier & Paravicini, 2020). In any case, it is clear beyond doubt that 
those who are to suffer most by the combined effects of the corona-pandemic and Brexit are 
the poor and vulnerable.  
 
In short, it is already questionable whether the UK will be able to pull itself up by its 
bootstraps out of the corona-crisis after the Brexit-leave without the tried and tested 
cooperation with the EU. Whether Britain, on its own, will have the additional power to assist 
its former African colonies to cope not only with the consequences of the corona-pandemic 
but also with the impact of a no-deal Brexit is even more unlikely. In the following sections a 
more detailed analysis of the (potential) combined effects of corona and Brexit on African 
economies by region, as well as the articulation between Britain and African Commonwealth 
members, will be given, with special emphasis on the impact on the most vulnerable social 
strata of society. 
 
 
Map 1 : Overview on the current state of affairs of Corona cases in Africa  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Daten & Fakten: Das Coronavirus in Afrika, Salzburg: afrika-info 
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(1) South Africa, Brexit and Corona  
 
According to available data, South Africa has been one of the hardest-hit African countries. 
 
 
Source: The Economist, London 
 
As of 15 June 2020, the cumulative number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in South Africa 
was 73,533, the bulk of it came from Western Cape Province (60%), followed by Gauteng 
(17%) and Eastern Cape (14%). The total number of reported death was 1,568 (NDP-2020). 
To avoid “an enormous catastrophe”, President Cyril Ramaphosa had ordered a three-week 
nationwide lockdown on 23 March, including border closure, the release of about 19,000 
prisoners (12% of a total of 155,000 prisoners in the jails of the country) and a ban to sale 
alcohol, supported by the South African army, from 26 March to 16 April (Thielke, 2020).  
 
  
Source: South Africa's response to Covid-19 is 'world-class' and here's why.  
947.co.za. 
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According to Focal Africa 3 director Marcus Hollington, South Africa counted among the top 
five world-class corona-fighting countries, because of prompt lockdown as well as very strict 
social distancing measures to try and curb the virus, which made for the ‘flattening of the 
(infection) curve’ (Hollington, 2020).  
 
However, most South Africans, notably the poor, mostly working in the informal sector, were 
more concerned about the economic impact of the pandemic than the disease itself. According 
to results of a Statistics-SA-survey, 93.2% of respondents (49% of them white; 36% black 
Africans) were very concerned or extremely concerned about the possible economic collapse 
of the country due to Corona (Githahu, 2020). And here again, Brexit comes in, because 
South Africa's economy is highly dependent both on the EU and the UK which has become 
the fourth largest export market of the country. In 2018 SA exports to the UK amounted to 
about R64-billion, mainly precious metals, motor vehicles and agricultural products. SA 
imports from the UK attained R43.5-billion. Nevertheless, the EU remained by far the biggest 
trading partner. The UK accounted for merely 18% of South African EU-exports and 10% of 
EU imports from South Africa (Maeko, 2020). Therefore, the government in Pretoria and its 
partners of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), including members of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and Mozambique, did their utmost to maintain 
normal Post-Brexit trade-relations with the EU as part of their Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) concluded already in October 2016. At that time Britain was still an EU 
member linked to the EPA as well, which stipulated that more than 90% of South African 
goods, including wines, platinum and motor vehicles, could enter into the UK completely 
duty-free or partially duty-free. However, because nevertheless South Africa’s car exports, 
would still be subject to 10% tariffs, and because the global supply chain in the automotive 
production would be definitely disrupted in the case of a Brexit no deal, the countries 
automotive industry would have been completely 'writen off' according to the former trade 
and industry minister in Pretoria, Rob Davies (Maeko, 2020). This was confirmed among 
other also by VW-South Africa, whose CEO told the press in August 2019 that if components 
from the EU would be no longer included in the value-added calculation because of a no-deal 
Brexit, import duties threaten in both directions. They would make cars - depending on the 
type - around 1,500 to 2,000 euros more expensive (DPA(os)-2019). This would have a 
tremendous impact on the South African labour market, independently from the inordinately 
more serious economic effects of a world-wide Corona-crisis.  
 
 
(2) Nigeria, Brexit and Corona  
 
In Nigeria, the most populous country on the continent (about 180 million), which has the 
world's most people living in absolute poverty (87 million), the pandemic started relatively 
late and modest, with the first confirmed case in on 27 February 2020, of an Italian citizen in 
Lagos. Only on 9 March, a second case had been reported in Ogun State of a Nigerian who 
had contact with the Italian citizen. According to the latest available figures, there were four 
hundred and ninety new cases on 16 June 2020.  
 
Nigerians had felt for a long time invulnerable. Until the first confirmed case of 27. February, 
many Nigerians saw the pandemic rather as a problem of foreigners. Past experience with 
Nigeria's successful fight against the Ebola virus in 2014 may have contributed to a feeling of 
invulnerability. Corona was dismissed by many of the Nigeria poor from Nigeria’s huge 
                                                 
3Research (FAR), Information Services, Germiston, Gauteng, South Africa, founded in 2020.   
7 
 
informal sector as a plague of the rich and the elite - or as God's punishment for the country's 
decades of looting and the hoped-for salvation from the virus. The government reacted late 
and imposed a curfew in Lagos and the capital Abuja. Only a little over a month after the first 
Corona case had been reported, on 29 March, a curfew was imposed on the 20 million 
metropolis of Lagos and the capital Abuja. It was extended by another two weeks on Easter 
Monday. Citizens were only allowed to leave their homes to provide essentials, and economic 
activities declined. International and national air traffic were suspended and the national 
borders closed. Freedom of assembly, including religious gatherings, economic activity, and 
freedom of movement were restricted in most of the 36 states (Thum, 2020). On 1 June, the 
federal government relaxed the lockdown imposed on Kano State and the ban placed on 
religious gatherings and banking operations for a period of four weeks and also shortened the 
curfew from 10 pm to 4 am (en.wikipedia). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Nigerian economy is on a downward slide. Only a year ago, Nigeria had emerged from a 
painful recession. Now economic activities were reduced under the Corona exit restrictions. 
Production, trade and consumption were falling, many of the coveted formal jobs will be lost 
and the dominant informal sector lacks revenue. Government revenue, which is derived from 
two-thirds from oil, is suffering from falling world market prices for crude oil, which is 
currently between US $ 25 and US $ 30 a barrel. However, the government counted in its 
budgeting still with US $ 57 a barrel. This could result in underfunding of the budget by 
almost 50%. Only a year ago, Nigeria emerged from a painful recession. The effects of the 
coronavirus will bring a huge downturn to the Nigerian economy in all scenarios. Besides, 
Nigeria faces a shortage of supply-chains for raw materials for production and other goods, as 
a large proportion of the goods had been stuck in Chinese ports (Thum, 2020). 
 
However, up to now, the corona-crisis had little impact on the government Brexit strategy. 
Apparently, both President Buhari and a great lot of Nigerian people shared the hybris of the 
 
Source: COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria, wikipedia 
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British that they are less vulnerable to the pandemic and could continue with high-flying Post-
Brexit plans of a new deal with the UK. Buhari apparently shared Johnson's vision of 
unleashed trade within the Commonwealth and with the UK. On 20. January he maintained in 
an article titled “A New Case for a Commonwealth based on trade”, that the long-standing 
bilateral relations between the two countries had been confirmed among others by the 2018 
bi-lateral security pact and collaboration in anti-trafficking. A new free trade agreement 
would present new opportunities for both, notably, because Nigeria’s economy would have a 
great deal to offer: Nigeria’s vast natural energy and mineral resources, unbarred through the 
ending of customs barriers, could help supply the much-needed growth stimulus for UK-
companies. Greater access to the UK would also give a stimulus to one of the world’s fastest 
expanding consumer groups with considerable purchasing power, the Nigerian middle class. 
On the other hand, the greater engagement of the UK in Nigeria’s economy would bring jobs 
to under-tapped sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing. Millions of highly skilled, 
English-speaking but underemployed young Nigerians, were eager to work but hitherto 
without the opportunities that foreign investment could bring to create jobs and build 
businesses. Buhari finally suggested close cooperation would be especially promising because 
both countries could better align regulations on investment, certification and trade because 
member countries’ national laws were built on the same principles of English jurisprudence. 
On the other hand, he cautioned that, while many Nigerians in the African Diaspora enjoy 
considerable benefits from living in the West, they do not always feel at the heart of the 
community. Therefore, visa restrictions and customs barriers should be reduced  (Olaniyi, 
2020). The Nigerians in the Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM) even saw the Brexit as an 
opportunity for Nigeria to harness human capital for her development in the UK. According to 
them, Nigeria should key into this by sending trade delegations to Britain to bring her 
investments in human capital home (Taiwo-Obalonye, 2020). 
 
However, the demand for lifting visa restrictions for Nigerians will be met with little response 
both by Johnson and British workers who presumably would be afraid of 'unfair competition' 
by the many informal low-paid Nigerians in their country and the latter’s bad repute as drug 
dealers and criminals. Presently there are up to 300,000 Nigerians and Britons of Nigerian 
descent resident in Britain. Many of them were apparently already afraid of a backlash against 
immigrants in Britain in which Nigerians and other foreigners would be targeted after Post-
Brexit times when the British have had their wish stemming the tide of immigrants to Britain 
(N.A., 2020).  
 
 
(3) Kenya, Brexit and Corona  
 
The corona pandemic started in Kenya on 15 March with the first cases reported in the capital 
city Nairobi and the coastal area Mombasa county. Although the case fatality ratio for 
COVID-19 had been much lower than for the SARS pandemic of 2003, the transmission of 
the COVID-19 virus had been significantly greater, including a significant total death toll. 
(COVID-19 pandemic in Kenya, Wikipedia). The latest COVID-19 update (16 June 2020) 
revealed a total of 3,860 confirmed cases and 105 death. In April, the following distribution of 
the 133 positive cases reported had been as follows: in Nairobi (86 cases), Mombasa (27), 
Kiambu (7), Busia (5), Kilifi, Kajiado, and Migori two cases each while Machakos and 
Muranga, had one case each. Kenya’s National Emergency Response Committee imposed 
social distancing requirements, closed bars and banned religious gatherings. Restaurants were 
to remain open only for take-away service. A daily curfew, effective from 27 March, from 7 
p.m. to 5 a.m. was in effect in the whole country. The same evening the curfew had been 
announced, police officers in Mombasa hunted commuters who had not made it home in time. 
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They drove men, women and children together with tear gas and truncheons, the government 
condoned the action (Starzmann, 2020). On 16 June, the government extended closing hours 
of restaurants and hotels from 5.00 p.m to 7.30 p.m daily with a stern warning that those who 
break the law will have their operating licences revoked (Ministry of Health, Nairobi, Kenya). 
In early May, the IMF approved US $ 739 million to be drawn under the Rapid Credit Facility 
to support the authorities' response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The rising COVID-19 cases 
prompted the government to declare a lock-down in Nairobi's Eastleigh and Old Town region 
in Mombasa (Market Watch, 2020).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the end of March, the Kenyan government imposed a curfew at night to contain the 
pandemic. Like in most African countries, the rescue packages introduced by the Nairobi 
government largely exclude the informal sector. More than 80 % of Kenyans work as day 
labourers. The curfew at night, closed bars and restaurants already mean that many no longer 
earn anything (DW, 2020). This implicated serious economic, social and security 
consequences given the large numbers of women, youth and vulnerable workers. The 
informal sector is the survival space for the majority of the 800,000 unemployed young job 
seekers who enter the Kenyan job market every year. The jobs in this sector are precarious, 
with limited wage and employment security, limited access to health services and social 
protection including weak frameworks for occupational safety and health, which makes the 
workers to be highly exposed and vulnerable to income loss and layoffs arising from the 
COVID-19 shocks (Omolo, 2020).  
 
Apparently, the corona pandemic had up to now little impact on Kenya’s view on the Brexit 
issue. Many Kenyan’s saw the UK’s departure from the EU as a disguised blessing because 
UK investors presumably would look for strongly growing countries that could both trade 
  
Source: Ministry of Health, Nairobi, Kenya 
10 
 
with the UK and were also unaffected by the EU’s imminent restrictions for the UK (Hopkins, 
2020). However, immigration from countries outside the EU such as Kenya would not be 
easier. After all, the anti-immigration attitude was at the root of the disaffection among many 
Brexit voters. The anti-immigration lobby was essentially racist. On the other hand, just then 
when the UK was the hardest hit by the pandemic, the British National Health Service 
desperately needs medical staff such as nurses for which Kenya had been a source for years. 
But that will be harder to realize now. London must now renegotiate at least 700 trade 
agreements with 27 nations, that Kenya would get priority is rather unlikely (Hopkins, 2020). 
Moreover, with the Post-Brexit scenario, Kenya would run the risk of losing business with 
both partners, The EU and UK. Up to now, the UK was part of close to 40 trade agreements 
which the EU has with more than 70 countries. In 2018, Kenya's exports to the EU rose to 
Sh131.20 billion from Sh125.61 billion in 2019. Whereas exports to the UK increased only to 
Sh40.19 billion from Sh38.55 billion over the same period. Imports from the UK and EU 
increased to Sh31.55 billion and Sh219.60 billion respectively in 2018 (Kivuva, 2019). 
Hitherto, major challenges hindering the growth of Kenya’s SMEs had been the limited 
access to finance and slow incorporation of latest technologies, as well as unawareness of 
international standards and quality assurance, and lack of research and innovation on new 
products. All this would drag the country from competing at the global market level (Kivuva, 
2019). However, the Kenyan government remained confident that the Commonwealth would 
provide trade-related assistance and innovation to Free Trade Area through funding to make 
transactions faster and increase efficiencies. According to the Commonwealth secretary-
general, Patricia Scotland Commonwealth countries enjoy 19% in cost advantage when 
measured against comparable country pairs. According to her high-flying visions, the intra-
Commonwealth trade and investment are set to increase to Sh202.6 trillion ($2 trillion) by 
2030. Just in comparison, in 2017, trade in goods and services was about Sh56.7 trillion (US $ 
560 billion; Kivuva, 2019). In January 2020, Prime Minister Johnson hailed trade ties with 
Kenya, when he positioned the UK during the UK-Africa Investment Summit in London as an 
important investment partner to Africa after Brexit. He cited his country’s US $53 million 
investment at the Mombasa Port in 2013 as an example of a relationship benefiting all of us. 
Moreover, Kenya, secured under the leadership of its President Uhuru Kenyatta, over Sh170 
billion worth of investment deals during the summit in sectors such as housing and 
entrepreneurship. Besides, the country’s first green bond was listed at the London Stock 
Exchange. And finally, alcohol producer Diageo promised to invest Sh21.9 billion to build 
environment-friendly breweries in Kenya and wider East Africa. The firm had already 
invested Sh14 billion in a Kisumu keg plant (Wambu, 2020). However, Kenyan observers 
cautioned already, that if the British economy would crash as a result of a poorly planned 
Brexit, a dangerous double blow would hit Kenyan exporters. There would be less to sell, and 
a higher tariff to pay for the privilege of belonging to the Post-Brexit Commonwealth. 
Therefore, Kenya would be well advised to aligning with partners worldwide (Munuhe, 
2019). 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Although Britain had been so far the hardest hit among the EU member states, and a second 
Corona-wave looms already over the United Kingdom which threatens to aggravate the 
economic impact of the pandemic on the island even more, the British prime minister Boris 
Johnson persists to leave the EU at the end of 2020, whatever the cost. Tthe monthly gross 
domestic product (GDP) fell by 20.4% in April 2020, the biggest fall the UK had ever seen, 
more than three times larger than in March and almost ten times larger than the steepest pre-
COVID-19 fall. Under these conditions it is already questionable whether the UK will be able 
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to pull itself up by its bootstraps out of the corona-crisis after the Brexit-leave without the 
tried and tested cooperation with the EU. Whether Britain, on its own, will have the additional 
power to assist its former African colonies to cope not only with the consequences of the 
corona-pandemic but also with the impact of a no-deal Brexit is even more unlikely. Under 
these conditions, one would expect that London would be keen more than ever to profit from 
a potential common EU bailout for the years to come, both for the economic and the health 
concerned aftermath of the pandemic. This the more so, because of additional negative 
employment effects of Brexit. However, Johnson does not seem to care. And it is open to 
question whether those who voted the Prime Minister in power would act now otherwise. In 
fact, some politicians ventured already the guess, the British government may provoke a 
chaotic no-deal exit from the EU to distract from its failure in the COVID 19 crisis (Mason, 
2020). In any case, it is clear beyond doubt that those who are to suffer most by the combined 
effects of the corona-pandemic and Brexit are the poor and vulnerable. 
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